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DEFERENCE OWED TRIBAL COURTS' JURISDICTIONAL
DETERMINATIONS: TOWARDS CO-EXISTENCE,
UNDERSTANDING, AND RESPECT BETWEEN DIFFERENT
CULTURAL AND JUDICIAL NORMS
ALEX TALLCHIEF SKIBINE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

About fifteen years ago, I gave a lecture on "Indian Sovereignty" in
Bellingham, Washington, in front of many tribal officials and representatives. The speaker following me was the then Attorney General for the
State of Washington. Having heard my concluding comments, he started
his speech by stating something to the effect that the states and the
tribes had to work together on jurisdictional issues. While he was willing
to talk to tribes about Indian jurisdiction, he would not talk to tribes
about Indian sovereignty because as he put it: "Indian jurisdiction exists
while Indian sovereignty does not."'
In response to his speech, I remarked to some tribal officials that, in
my mind, one could not talk about Indian jurisdiction without first
talking about Indian sovereignty because without Indian sovereignty, there
could not be any Indian jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is nothing more than
the exercise of inherent sovereign powers. 2
In the last fifteen years, however, the Supreme Court has reshaped
the landscape of Federal Indian law in answering questions concerning
the existence of tribal jurisdiction. The Court has refocused the inquiry
by moving away from a discussion of the existence of tribal jurisdiction
based on Indian sovereignty and has instead answered jurisdictional questions by asking itself whether the exercise of tribal jurisdiction is necessary
to tribal self-government or vital to the tribes' right to self-determination.'
At first, it seems that this change is not important, because "Indian
sovereignty" can be defined as the exercise of the powers of self-government. But the manner in which the Court has phrased the issue does
make a difference. If the Court asks whether Indian tribes have sovereign
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah. B.A. 1973, Tufts University; J.D. 1976,
Northwestern University. Deputy Counsel for Indian Affairs, Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 1981-89. Member, Osage Indian Nation of Oklahoma. The
author would like to thank Professors Leslie Francis and Kate Lahey, and Dean Lee Teitelbaum,
for their invaluable comments during the writing of this article.
I. The Attorney General was Slade Gordon. A year later he argued the state's position in the
landmark decision of Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). See discussion infra notes
95-98. He is currently serving as the United States Senator for the State of Washington.
2. "Sovereignty" is "[tlhe supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent
state is governed ... the self-sufficient source of political power, from which all specific powers

are derived."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1396 (6th ed. 1990).

3. See discussion infra note 108-109 and accompanying text.
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rights because these rights, which have always existed, have never been

relinquished in a treaty or taken away by an act of Congress, the Court
is asking a legal question, the answer to which depends on statutory
construction and historical interpretation. If, however, the Court asks
whether a tribe's sovereign rights still exist because they are vital to tribal
self-government, it is asking a question of a more political and subjective
to this second question will largely depend
nature. In effect, the answer
4
on who decides the issue.
In the same decade in which it was redefining its test to determine
the existence of tribal jurisdiction, the Court held in National Farmers
Union v. Crow Tribe5 that the question of tribal court jurisdiction is a
question of federal law. This ruling gave federal courts jurisdiction over
cases involving issues of tribal jurisdiction. 6 Two years later, in Iowa
Mutual v. LaPlante,7 the Court extended its holding to cases which met
the diversity requirement of federal law. 8 In both cases, however, the
Court mandated litigants to "exhaust" the available tribal court remedies
before filing in federal courts. The main reason for such an "exhaustion"
requirement was anchored in the congressional policy of protecting tribal
self-government and encouraging Indian self-determination.
This article analyzes what impact the Court's journey from tribal
sovereignty to tribal self-government should have on the deference owed
to decisions of tribal courts when the courts make jurisdictional determinations pursuant to the mandate given in National Farmers Union,
when these decisions are reviewed by the federal courts. 9 Should the tribal

4. In determining the sovereign rights of Indian tribes by relating it to what is vital to tribal
self-government, the Court seems to have moved closer to adopting a position similar to the position
adopted under international law when it comes to recognizing the rights of Indigenous People. The
problem here is that the Court still recognizes doctrines of domestic law which are contrary to
international norms such as 'the so-called plenary power doctrine under which Congress is recognized
as having virtually unlimited power to curtail the sovereignty of Indian nations. For articles comparing
the rights of Indians under domestic and international law as well as exploring some of the problems
with the right of self-government as currently recognized under international law, see S. James
Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary International Law, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP.
L. No. 2, at 1 (1991); Curtis Berkey, International Law and Domestic Courts: Enhancing SelfDetermination for Indigenous People, 5 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 65 (1992); and Robert A. Williams
Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous
Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660.
5. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
6. The U.S. Judicial Code provides that "[tihe District Courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1331 (West Supp. 1993).
7. 480 U.S. 9 (1986).
8. The U.S. Judicial Code provides in part that "[tihe district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-(I) citizens of different States ....
" 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1332(a) (West Supp. 1993).
9. It is not the purpose of this article to analyze the complex issues involving how much
deference should be paid to the final judgments of tribal courts when litigants attempt to enforce
these judgments in other forums such as state courts. For a comprehensive treatment of this subject,
see Robert Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries: Full
Faith and Credit, Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L. REV. 589 (1990).
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courts' decisions be reviewed de novo or should they be reviewed under
a more deferential standard?10
I will argue that a more deferential standard should be applied by
comparing the doctrines of exhaustion and deference as they have developed in federal Indian law and in administrative law. Because the
Supreme Court has adopted a test which determines the existence of
tribal jurisdiction by asking whether the exercise of such jurisdiction is
vital to tribal self-determination or necessary to tribal self-government,
it is concluded that such jurisdictional determinations are not questions
of law. Rather, these determinations should more appropriately be termed,
to use an administrative law terminology, "mixed" questions, involving
the application of law to facts. Drawing an analogy with the doctrines
of deference owed decisions of administrative tribunals upon judicial
review, it is also concluded that jurisdictional determinations made by
tribal courts should enjoy at least the same kind of deference that is
given decisions of administrative tribunals. In other words, federal courts
should uphold these jurisdictional determinations on review unless they
are unreasonable or without any rational basis.
The conclusions concerning the deference owed tribal courts' jurisdictional determinations are not based on the fact that tribal courts are like
administrative courts, for they are not." As a matter of fact, quite the
opposite is true. 12 Tribal courts have and should maintain a distinct
political existence. Courts give deference to administrative agencies largely
because they perceive administrative agencies as being experts in the field.
Similarly, tribal courts should also be perceived as the experts in determining their own jurisdiction, especially if the jurisdictional questions

10. Currently, although there are no Supreme Court decisions on point, at least one circuit court
has held that these decisions are reviewed de novo. See infra text accompanying notes 84-86.
II. In one case, Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965), the Ninth Circuit did
hold that tribal courts were indeed like administrative tribunals. This decision has not been followed
and is obviously not the law today. Otherwise, every decision of a tribal court would be reviewable
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), 471 U.S. 845 (1985). Instead, the only cases reviewable under
National Farmers Union are the ones which present a federal question under 5 U.S.C. § 1331. Even
under § 1332 diversity jurisdiction, LaPlante held that a federal court can only review the findings
of the tribal court once it has found that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction. Iowa Mut.
Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19.
12. For an interesting discussion about the place of tribal courts within the United States justice
system, see Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 Wu.LErrE L. REV. 841
(1990). Professor Clinton describes three models of judicial relationships: the transnational sovereignty
model, the federalism model and the administrative model. He then concludes that the relationship
between federal and tribal courts does not fall in any of these models and concludes that "what
is ultimately required is the clear delineation of a fourth model-a tribal model of intergovernmental
relations." Among other things, this model would incorporate the application of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution to judgments of tribal courts. For a different view,
see Philip J. Smith, National Farmers Union and its Progeny: Does It Create a New Federal Court
System, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 333, 348-49 (1989), where the author argues that the effect of
National Farmers Union was to create a new branch of the federal judiciary in which tribal courts
are relegated to be adjuncts to federal courts. The author argues that tribal courts have become
similar to military courts, tax courts, or territorial courts. While I cannot agree with Mr. Smith's
conclusions, it is true that when it comes to the Courts of Indian Offenses, the so-called "CFR"
Courts, we are literally speaking at least of quasi-federal administrative tribunals.
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are determined by reference to what is necessary to tribal self-government
or vital to self-determination. This argument is bolstered by the fact that
Congress has adopted a policy of promoting tribal self-government and
encouraging self-determination. 3 The development of a separate and
distinct tribal jurisprudence in this area is vital to the survival of tribal
culture and would, therefore, fulfill these congressional policies.
Legal scholars have argued that decisions of tribal courts should be
given full faith and credit or should be upheld as a matter of comity
between sovereigns. 14 Perhaps, in the best of all worlds, this could be
the preferred solution. However, understanding the political realities, this
article recommends a solution which would still allow tribal courts to
survive as "tribal" institutions without being choked by the vise of
surrogacy. Deference to tribal courts in this context is about acknowledging
differences and recognizing that "difference" is beneficial to both the
Indian nations and the United States. 5 In many ways, this article is
about the proper relationship the United States should have with the
Indian nations. To be sure, the relationship has not been an equal one.
But the Supreme Court said that Indian nations were domestic dependent
nations, not enslaved nations.' 6 This article is about the continuing viability
of Indian nations as distinct sovereigns within the United States.
In order for deference to be appropriate, it is of course necessary for
tribal courts to hear the cases in the first place. Therefore, it is vital
that the doctrine of exhaustion of tribal remedies, as first announced in
National Farmers Union, be properly implemented. Accordingly, before
proceeding to the deference analysis in Part III, an examination of the
exhaustion issues is presented first.
II.

THE EXTENT AND LIMIT OF THE EXHAUSTION OF
TRIBAL REMEDIES DOCTRINE

An analysis of the tribal exhaustion requirement as mandated by the
Supreme Court is presented below along with a survey regarding how
the Court's decisions concerning exhaustion of tribal remedies have been
implemented in the federal circuits. Finding a striking similarity between
the reasons given for the doctrine of exhaustion of tribal remedies and

13. Such policy is reflected in legislation such as the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203; the Indian Financing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-262,
88 Stat. 77; and the Indian Child Welfare Act, Pub L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (these three acts
are codified as amended at scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
14. See generally Clinton, supra note 12.
15. Professor Judith Resnick wrote:
The most difficult issues for federal courts' jurisprudence are to explain how to
engender differences, how deep the respect should be for difference, when the
federal government's right to assert baseline exists, and then to ascertain where
that federal floor should be. Constitutional and case law exegesis alone cannot
accomplish these tasks. Rather, on-going relational struggles illuminate the changing
shapes of the floors that are continually to be sought.
Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 671, 757
(1989).
16. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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the reasons given for the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
as developed in administrative law, it follows that the extent and limit
of the exhaustion requirements in federal Indian law should generally
conform to the principles set out in administrative law.
A.

Supreme Court Precedents
The dispute in National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe
7 arose when a Crow Indian
of Indians1
minor was hit by a motorcycle
in the parking lot of a school located on the Crow Indian reservation.
The State of Montana owned the parking lot in fee. The minor, through
his parents, sued the school district in Crow Tribal Court. The Tribal
Court awarded a default judgment to the minor and the school district's
insurer, National Farmers Union, sought injunctive relief in the federal
district court, alleging that the Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction
over the dispute and that this jurisdictional issue presented a federal
question.
The district court granted a permanent injunction but the Supreme
Court found the action premature. Although the Supreme Court agreed
that the federal court had jurisdiction over such issues because the issue
of tribal jurisdiction presented a "federal question" under section 1331
of the Judicial Code, 8 it also held that the federal district court should
stay its hand until the tribal court had "a full opportunity to determine
its own jurisdiction." 9
The Supreme Court justified exhaustion of tribal court remedies because
Congress was committed to a policy supporting tribal self-government
and self-determination. That policy, the Court stated, "favors a rule that

17. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
18. Id. at 852. The Court stated:
In this case the petitioners contend that the Tribal Court has no power to enter
a judgment against them. Assuming that the power to resolve disputes arising within
the territory governed by the Tribe was once an attribute of inherent sovereignty,
the petitioners, in essence, contend that the tribe has to some extent been divested
of this aspect of sovereignty .... The question whether an Indian tribe retains
the power to compel a non-Indian property owner to submit to the civil jurisdiction
of a tribal court is one that must be answered by reference to federal law and is
a "federal question" under section 1331.
Id.
19. Id. at 857. inding federal jurisdiction to review jurisdictional determinations of tribal courts
under 5 U.S.C. 1331 is not the clear cut case that the Supreme Court made it to be in National
Farmers Union. Commenting on the approach adopted in NationalFarmers Union, Professor Robert
Clinton recently observed that the rule in National Farmers Union was novel because usually res
judicata and similar finality doctrines should operate to prevent federal review of at least state
cases. He then added:
Prior to National Farmers Union, one therefore might have thought that any tribal
court adjudication that addressed and resolved questions a tribal court subject matter
jurisdiction would have been preclusive of federal court adjudication. Nevertheless,
without any significant consideration of such finality problems, questions that lie
at the heart of respect for the authority and sovereignty of the courts of another
sovereign, the Court created a judge-made exhaustion rule that permits federal
judges to directly review the decisions of tribal courts on such important jurisdictional
questions .... Thus, National Farmers Union constituted a remarkable feat of
judicial governance by a Court not known for its forays into judicial activism.
Clinton, supra, note 12, at 879-80.
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will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first
opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the challenge." 20
The Court also acknowledged that "the existence and extent of a tribal
court's jurisdiction will require a careful examination of Indian sovereignty
and the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or
diminished .... ,,21 Exhaustion was also justified because the development
of a full record by tribal courts would serve the orderly administration
of justice in the federal courts. Finally, the exhaustion requirement would
provide other courts with the benefit of the tribal courts' expertise in
22
the event of judicial review.
Two years later, in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,23 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the exhaustion requirement in a case in which
the petitioner insurance company invoked federal court jurisdiction because of diversity of citizenship rather than the existence of a federal
question. 24 At the time the federal action was filed, a law suit involving
the same parties and the same issues was pending before the Blackfeet
Tribal Court. 2 The question before the Court was whether a federal
court may exercise diversity jurisdiction before the tribal court system
has an opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction.
In this case, LaPlante, a member of the Tribe, was working for the
Wellman Ranch, also owned by members of the Tribe. LaPlante's truck
jackknifed while it was being driven by LaPlante on the reservation.
LaPlante initially brought a law suit in tribal court against the Wellmans
and Iowa Mutual, the insurer of the Wellman Ranch. The tribal court
concluded that it had jurisdiction because the Tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction was coextensive with its legislative jurisdiction and the Tribe could
regulate the conduct of non-Indians engaged in commercial relations with
Indians on the reservation. 26 In its diversity suit in federal court, Iowa
Mutual argued that it had no duty to indemnify LaPlante, a member
of the Tribe, for an accident that occurred on the reservation because
his injuries fell outside the coverage of the insurance policy.
After acknowledging that tribal courts play a vital role in tribal selfgovernment, the Court stated that "in diversity cases, as well as federalquestion cases, unconditional access to the federal forum would place it
in direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter's
'27
authority over reservation affairs."
The Court also stated, however, that exhaustion is required as a matter
of comity, not as a jurisdictional prerequisite. 28 The exhaustion rule,

20. Id. at 856.
21. Id. at 855-56.
22. Id. at 857.
23. 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987).
24. Id. at 16; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West Supp. 1993).
25. Although the tribal court had ruled initially that it had jurisdiction, the tribal appellate
process had not been completed.
26. See discussion infra note 107.
27. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 16.
28. Id. at 15.
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29
therefore, does not deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.
Thus, the Court concluded that "[a]lthough petitioner must exhaust
available tribal remedies before instituting suit in federal court, the Blackfeet Tribal Court's determination of tribal jurisdiction is ultimately subject
to review." 30 Yet, even though federal jurisdiction was requested because
of diversity, the Court remarked that "unless a federal court determines
that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction, however, proper deference to
the tribal court system precludes relitigation of issues raised by the
LaPlantes' bad-faith claim and resolved in the Tribal Courts."',
Since "exhaustion" is mandated only as a matter of comity and is
not a jurisdictional prerequisite, the question that has confronted the
circuits has been to delimit the situations in which exhaustion is required.
In this respect, three issues have troubled the circuits. The first issue is
whether exhaustion is mandated in all cases arising on the reservation
or whether such cases should also concern "reservation affairs." The
second issue is whether the exhaustion requirement should apply to cases
involving purely questions of federal law. Within this second issue, a
sub-issue to be explored is whether exhaustion applies to cases where
federal court jurisdiction is premised on a federal question but the federal
question is not whether the tribal court has jurisdiction.
In the next two sections, I will argue that when federal jurisdiction is
premised on diversity or on the existence of a federal question but the
federal question is whether the tribe has jurisdiction, the "reservation
affair" inquiry should be recasted as an inquiry into whether there is a
colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction. Next, I will argue that exhaustion
of tribal remedies should be mandated even in cases involving pure
questions of federal law as long as the issues involve an attack on the
jurisdiction of the tribal court or the case involves a "reservation affair,"
in that the resolution of the issue will impact tribal interests or the
governmental authority of the tribe over the reservation. In other words,

29. For an article critical of both National Farmers Union and LaPlante, see Michael Pacheco,
Finality in Indian Tribunal Decisions: Respecting oi~r Brothers' Vision, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 119
(1991). Commenting on LaPlante, the author stated:
Ideally, the opinion would have made a plea for recognition of finality in Indian
tribunal decisions. Those decisions should be accorded full faith and credit no less
than the highest court of any state. Only by demonstrating this level of deference
to Indian tribunals can Marshall's opinion approximate some semblance of coherence.
Although it appears internally inconsistent, the LaPlante holding adheres to the
view that Indian tribunals are reviewable in federal courts, thus opening the door
still further for potentially dangerous intrusions into what remains of Indian selfgovernment.
Id. at 153. Mr. Pacheco argues for the creation of a Federal Indian Court of Appeals as one way
to promote tribal self-government. In his article, Pacheco criticizes an approach similar to the one
adopted in this article as lacking finality. In this article, however, I do not take issue with whether
National Farmers Union was rightly decided and I agree that, in an ideal world, "Full Faith and
Credit" would be the preferred solution. Taking stock of the political realities and the fact that
National Farmers Union is not likely to be reversed in the near future, I argue instead that a
deference to tribal courts' jurisdictional determinations similar to the one given administrative agencies
in review of "mixed" questions of law and fact would substantially improve the current law in,
to borrow Mr. Pacheco's words, "respecting our brothers' vision."
30. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 19.
31. Id.

198
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I take the position that the "reservation affair" requirement is only
relevant when the jurisdiction of the federal court is invoked pursuant
to its "federal question" jurisdiction and the argument is being made
that exhaustion of tribal remedies is not applicable because the issue is
a "pure" question of federal law which does not involve an attack on
the jurisdiction of the tribe.
Is Exhaustion Mandated in All Cases Arising on the
Reservations? Reservation Affair vs. Colorable Claim of Tribal
Jurisdiction Analysis.
The Court in National Farmers Union mandated exhaustion of tribal
court remedies in all but a few cases. The Court stated:
We do not suggest that exhaustion would be required where an
assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass or
is conducted in bad faith, or where the action is patently violative
of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be
of an adequate opportunity to challenge
futile because of the lack
32
the court's jurisdiction.
B.

This language seems to indicate that under National Farmers Union,
exhaustion is mandated as long as none of the four above-quoted exceptions are found present and the case arose on the reservation. It is
undoubtedly true, therefore, that exhaustion is mandated in all cases
arising on the reservation where the "federal question" giving rise to
federal jurisdiction is the existence of tribal court jurisdiction. In LaPlante,
however, the Court stated that where the jurisdiction of the federal courts
is based on diversity of citizenship, exhaustion is mandated because
"unconditional access to the federal forum would place it in direct
competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter's authority
over reservation affairs." 33 This language raises the question of whether
there is a "reservation affair" requirement in diversity cases. If there is
such a requirement, one has to ask what is a "reservation affair" and
whether such a requirement makes any sense.
LaPlante's "reservation affair" language has certainly created some
confusion among the courts. In Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co.,34 the
Ninth Circuit, relying on Stock West Corporation v. Taylor35 ("Stock
West IF'), stated: "More recently, we held that deference to tribal courts
is not required when the disputed issue is not a 'reservation affair' or
did not 'arise on the reservation." ' '3 6 Later in the opinion, however, the
court remarked: "As we recently held in Stock West II, the mandatory
exhaustion requirement announced in LaPlante and National Farmers

32. 471 U.S. at 856 n.21 (citations omitted).
33. 480 U.S. at 16.
34. 947 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1991). Crawford involved an automobile accident which occurred
on the reservation and involved Indian occupants suing a non-Indian corporation in a product
liability case.
35. Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 942 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Stock West Il].
36. 947 F.2d 1405, 1407 (emphasis added).
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Union does not apply when the dispute is not a reservation affair and
did not arise on the reservation."" Careless drafting in the Crawford
opinion leaves one wondering whether exhaustion is required only if the
case arose on the reservation and is a "reservation affair," or whether
exhaustion is required as long as the case arose on the reservation or is
a reservation affair.
The actual language used by the court in Stock West II stated that:
[T]he exhaustion requirement cannot be absolute whenever tribal court
jurisdiction is asserted. Where the civil action involves non-Indian
parties, concerns incidents which occurred off of the reservation, and
will not impact the tribe's authority, there is little reason to require
that the tribal court have first crack at the case ....

when the issue

in dispute is truly a "reservation affair" or "arose on the reservation,"
the federal court has no option but to defer.3"
Although the initial Stock West II decision never gave a comprehensive
definition of what constituted a "reservation affair," it did state that
reservation affairs were involved in cases which "directly implicated tribal
interests on the reservation, both because an Indian was a party ...
and because the outcome of the suit would impact economic activity . ..
on the reservation."

'39

Stock West II involved a non-Indian corporation, Stock West, which
brought an action against a non-Indian reservation attorney to recover
for legal malpractice. The malpractice involved an opinion letter the
attorney had given Stock West in which he advised the corporation on
whether certain contracts the corporation had with the Tribe should be
approved by the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs. Stock West
argued that the tribe had no jurisdiction because the law suit involved
two non-Indians and the malpractice occurred when the tribal attorney's
letter was delivered to the Corporation in Portland, Oregon, which is
not part of the reservation. The district court dismissed Stock West I
on the ground that Stock West had to first exhaust its tribal remedies
in tribal court.40
The Ninth Circuit initially reversed, and in the opinion cited in Crawford, held that, since the transaction took place off the reservation and
involved two non-Indians, it "falls without the nebulous confines of a
' 4' That initial
reservation affair and does not arise on the reservation."
42
banc.
en
Ninth Circuit decision was, however, reversed
The Ninth Circuit en banc decision relied mainly on three facts to
uphold the district court's decision to require exhaustion of tribal remedies.
First, the tribe's attorney drafted the opinion letter on the reservation.

37. Id. at
38. Stock
39. Id. at
40. Stock
41. Stock
42. Stock

1407-08.
West I, 942 F.2d at 660.
662.
West Corp. v. Taylor, 737 F. Supp. 601 (D. Or. 1990) [hereinafter Stock West 1].
West II, 942 F.2d at 663.
West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Stock West III].
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Second, the letter involved a loan negotiated and signed on tribal lands.
Third, the loan was essential for the tribal corporation to build a saw
mill on the reservation. The Ninth Circuit resolved the issue by stating:
We conclude that the record presents a colorable question whether
the alleged malpractice and false representations arose out of a contractual relationship between Stock West and the Colville Tribes that
commenced on tribal lands. By colorable we mean that on the record
is plausible and
before us, the assertion of tribal court jurisdiction
43
appears to have a valid or genuine basis.

In order to be legitimate, the "reservation affair" requirement in
diversity cases should be tied to or recasted as a jurisdictional inquiry
into whether there is a colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction. Initially
focusing the inquiry on whether there is a colorable claim of tribal court
jurisdiction (colorable means plausible in that context) makes sense since
this is the one issue which will be reviewed by the federal court after
the tribal court's remedies are exhausted. In this respect, it would be
absurd and a waste of time for the "reservation affair" requirement to
be more encompassing than a "colorable claim" requirement since it
would mean that some cases would be sent back to tribal court even
though the assertion of tribal court jurisdiction is not even colorable.
Under such circumstances, it seems that any finding by a tribal court
that it has jurisdiction would be virtually certain to be reversed on appeal
by the federal court.
In any case, the jurisdictional inquiry based on a colorable claim
requirement is not meaningfully different than the "reservation affair"
inquiry which asks whether tribal interests are implicated." The reason
for this is that for a lawsuit arising on the reservation not to be considered
a "reservation affair" it would have to at least involve non-Indians. Yet,
the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts over non-Indians is co-extensive with
the legislative jurisdiction of tribal governments and as further explained
below, in many cases, the tribal legislative jurisdiction over non-Indians
depends on whether the exercise of tribal jurisdiction is necessary to
tribal self-government or vital to self-determination.4 5
The initial confusion in Crawford concerning whether exhaustion is
only required if the case both arose on the reservation and is a reservation
affair was probably first generated from language in cases such as Wellman
v. Chevron, 6 which summarized LaPlante as follows:

43. Id.at 919.
44. Except for Part IllI's discussion on the nature of the "implicit divestiture of tribal sovereignty"
test as it relates to the proper amount of deference that should be allocated to tribal courts' decisions
by federal courts, this article does not focus on what should be the proper extent and scope of
the tribal courts' jurisdiction. This subject was comprehensively addressed in Michael J. Dale's
article, Tribal Courts Civil Jurisdiction Over Reservation Based Claims: The Long Walk to the
Courthouse, 66 Or. L. Rev. 753 (1987). I agree with the conclusions presented by Professor Dale
that the tribal courts should have jurisdiction over all claims that arise on an Indian reservation.
I do not believe, however, that this is the prevailing view among the federal courts.
45. See discussion infra notes 101-120.
46. 815 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1987).
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The Supreme Court held that a federal court may not exercise diversity
jurisdiction over a civil dispute relating to reservation affairs before
has first had an opportunity
an appropriate Indian tribal court 4 system
7
to determine its own jurisdiction.
Wellman, which involved a suit brought by an Indian contractor against
a non-Indian corporation for work done on an Indian reservation, also
had opined in dicta that "it is in non-Indian matters only that nonIndians can go to district court directly.""
It is not legally correct to assert that because the dispute involves nonIndians, exhaustion is not required. If federal jurisdiction is premised
on a "federal question" and the federal question concerns the jurisdiction
of the tribal court, exhaustion should always be mandated. Even if federal
jurisdiction is based on diversity and does not involve an attack on the
jurisdiction of the tribal court, the case can still be a reservation affair
even though non-Indians are the only parties.
For instance, in Tom's Amusement Co. v. Cuthbertson, d/b/a/ Tepee
Amusements, 49 a federal district court mandated exhaustion of tribal court
remedies in a case involving a contract dispute between two non-Indians
operating a gaming establishment on the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indian
Reservation pursuant to a gaming license and ordinances established by
the tribe. More specifically, one non-Indian was claiming that the other
non-Indian had breached a contract to pay for some gaming machines
which had been delivered to him on the Cherokee reservation. The court
acknowledged that the interpretation of a contractual arrangement for
the operation of a gaming establishment involved issues governed by
federal law.5 0 Nevertheless, relying on the fact that federal court jurisdiction would impair the tribal courts' authority over reservation affairs,
the district court mandated exhaustion. That the case involved two nonIndians arguing over questions of federal law was not, in and of itself,
sufficient to prevent exhaustion of tribal court remedies.
C. Extension of the Exhaustion Requirement to Determinations
Involving Pure Questions of Federal Law
Some federal courts have taken the position that exhaustion is not
mandated if the issues to be decided represent purely questions of federal
law. In addition, there seems to be a legitimate question whether exhaustion of tribal remedies is mandated when the federal court jurisdiction
is premised on the existence of a federal question and this federal question
is not the existence of tribal court jurisdiction.
For instance, in the initial Stock West H decision, after finding that
the case did not arise on the reservation and did not concern a "reservation

47.
48.
49.
50.
1986).

Id.
Id.
20
Id.

at 578.
at 579.
Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3102 (1993).
at 3103; see generally 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-12 (West 1983); 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 851-52 (West
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affair," the Ninth Circuit, citing Burlington Northern Railroad v. Blackfeet Tribe,5 added that a review of the record did not support exhaustion
because "the principal issues presented are of state or federal law, and
5' 2
the tribal court possesses no special expertise in the subject matter.
In Burlington Northern Railroad v. Blackfeet Tribe, Burlington Northern sought a declaration that the Tribe lacked the sovereign power to
tax Burlington's on-reservation rights-of-ways. The Blackfeet Tribe filed
a motion to dismiss, arguing that it had sovereign immunity from suit.
The district court refused to grant the tribe's motion to dismiss on
sovereign immunity grounds but granted the tribe's motion for summary
judgment on the merits. In affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated in a
footnote that it was proper for the district court to reach the merits
without mandating exhaustion of tribal remedies because "[tihe complaint
presents issues of federal, not tribal, law; no proceeding is pending in
any tribal court; the tribal court possesses no special expertise; and
exhaustion would not have assisted the district court in deciding federal
law issues.""
Another case relied upon in the initial Stock West II decision is Myrick
v. Devils Lake Sioux Manufacturing Corp.54 Myrick involved a sixtyfour-year-old American Indian male who resided on the Devils Lake Sioux
Indian Reservation and brought an action against a corporation which
was fifty-one percent owned by the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe. He alleged
race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 55
56
age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
and a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act." The federal district
court did not require exhaustion of tribal remedies. The court distinguished
both National Farmers Union and LaPlante on the ground that they
involved challenges to the jurisdiction of the tribal courts which were
termed "issues of particular application and importance to the tribes
themselves," 58 while "the present case predominately presents issues of
federal law." 5 9

51. 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991).
52. Stock West II, 942 F.2d at 663.
53. Burlington Northern R.R., 924 F.2d at 901 n.2.
54. 718 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.D. 1989).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1988).
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & 1992 Supp.).
57. Id. §§ 201-219.
58. Myrick, 718 F. Supp. at 755.
59. Id. Another example of an erroneous ruling is Pittsburgh and Midway Coal Mining Co. v.
Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1990). The issue in Yazzie involved the tribe's power to tax the
mine of a coal company. The resolution of this issue turned on whether the mine was located on
the reservation. The coal company argued that the part of the reservation where the mine was
located had been disestablished by congressional action. Ruling that the mine was not on reservation
lands, the Tenth Circuit recognized that both National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual mandated
exhaustion but stated: "The holdings of the cases, however, did not extend to issues where reservation
boundaries, in contrast to subject matter jurisdiction, were at issue, as is the case here." Id. at
1422. Because the tribe had not raised the exhaustion issue on appeal, the Tenth Circuit declined
to rule on this issue sua sponte.
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Cases like Burlington Northern Railroad v. Blackfeet Tribe and Myrick
were wrongly decided. Exhaustion of tribal court remedies should extend
to all cases involving pure questions of federal law as long as these cases
arise on lands arguably under tribal jurisdiction and either attack the
jurisdiction of the tribal courts or concern reservation affairs. This conclusion is derived from the same reasons which guided the Supreme Court
to require exhaustion of tribal remedies in National Farmers Union and
LaPlante. If tribal courts are truly vital to tribal self-government, there
is no reason to limit exhaustion only to cases that do not involve "pure"
issues of federal law. All the reasons given for mandating exhaustion:
encouraging tribal self-government, protecting tribal control over reservation affairs, preserving the autonomy of tribal courts, facilitating judicial
economy by having the tribal court develop the factual record, and availing
federal courts of the expertise of tribal courts, apply as long as the
federal law in question concerns the jurisdiction of the tribal court or
affects the tribal interests or authority over reservation affairs. For instance, in Myrick,60 where the issue was whether the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA) was applicable on Indian reservations and
reservation Indians, it is disingenuous to argue that the potential appliof the ADEA would not have an impact on tribal self-governcability
61
ment.
One argument supporting exhaustion in cases involving pure questions
of federal law appears in the text of National Farmers Union. In that
case, the Court took the position that exhaustion is not required in cases
where the tribal action was "patently violative of express jurisdictional
prohibitions. '62 Although the question that remains to be answered after
National Farmers Union is how express the jurisdictional prohibition has
to be before that exception to the exhaustion requirement can be invoked,
the very existence of this exception implies that exhaustion of tribal court
remedies is mandated in those "not so clear" cases. Since it seems obvious
that the "express jurisdictional prohibitions" referred to by the Court
have to be contained in federal statutes or treaties, it follows that the
Court assumed that exhaustion would be mandated even in cases that
only concern interpretation of federal statutory law.
There are other good arguments to be made for the proposition that
the federal system would benefit from allowing tribal courts to play a

60. See Myrick v. Devils Lake Mfg. Corp., 718 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.D. 1989).
61. In cases where the issue is whether a federal statute of general applicability applies on an
Indian reservation, the courts have adopted a test which determines the applicability of such statutes
on Indian reservations by reference to whether application of the statute would affect a specific
right of tribal self-government. It is obvious that such issues do impact tribal self-government and
are, therefore, "reservation affairs." For a recent case on this issue, see EEOC v. Fond Du Lac
Heavy Equipment & Constr. Co., 20 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 2075
(1993), where the issue was the applicability of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
For a comprehensive treatment of this issue, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Applicability of Federal
Laws of General Application to Indian Tribes and Reservation Indians, 25 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 85
(1991).
62. 471 U.S. at 856 n.21.
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role in the resolution of questions of law. For example, in a recent article
on the importance of tribal courts' adjudications concerning interpretation
of tribal constitutions, Professor Frank Pommersheim stated:
Constitutional decision making in tribal courts can also potentially
perform other important functions, in addition to its central task of
illuminating the distinctive markers of tribal sovereignty. These functions include delineating the relationship of tribal courts to federal
courts, providing tribal interpretations of federal standards, and incorporating international legal norms into tribal jurisprudence. 61
The reasons supporting the importance of the function of tribal constitutional decisions in its relation to the federal system are equally applicable
to tribal courts' decisions concerning pure questions of federal law if the
federal law is a law which affects the jurisdiction of the tribal court or
concerns "reservation affairs" in the sense that resolution of the federal
question will have an impact on tribal self-government or tribal interests.
Another important reason to extend exhaustion to cases even if they
involve pure questions of federal law is derived from a comparison between
the reasons given in federal Indian law for the exhaustion of tribal
remedies and the reasons given in administrative law for the exhaustion
of administrative remedies. This does not mean that tribal courts are
like administrative agencies or occupy the same position within the federal
system.64 An analysis of the exhaustion doctrine as it exists in the field
of administrative law, however, reveals that the policies which have driven
the courts to mandate exhaustion of administrative remedies are essentially
similar to the ones that have guided the courts to require exhaustion of
tribal court remedies. It is therefore logical to conclude that the doctrine
of exhaustion of tribal remedies should follow the same principles which
have been applied to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Summarizing the reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies for
the D.C. Circuit, Judge Skelly Wright wrote:
The exhaustion requirement serves four primary purposes. First, it
carries out the congressional purpose in granting authority to the
agency by discouraging the ...

flouting of the administrative process.

Second, it protects agency autonomy by allowing the agency the
opportunity in the first instance to apply its expertise .... Third,
it aids judicial review by allowing the parties and the agency to
develop the facts of the case in the administrative proceeding. Fourth,
it promotes judicial economy by avoiding needless repetition of administrative and judicial factfinding, and by perhaps avoiding the
necessity of any judicial involvement at all if the parties successfully
vindicate their claims before the agency. 65

63. Frank Pommersheim, A Path Near the Clearing: An Essay on ConstitutionalAdjudication
in Tribal Courts, 27 GONZ. L. REv. 393, 410 (1991-92).
64. See discussion supra note 11.
65. Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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Comparing these reasons with the reasons given in National Farmers
Union and LaPlante we can draw the following similarities. First, congressional policy: the Supreme Court mandated the exhaustion of tribal
remedies in recognition of the congressional policy of promoting tribal
6
self-government and encouraging self-determination. 6 Second, autonomy:
the tribal exhaustion requirement was adopted to protect the autonomy
of tribal courts because the Supreme Court realized that federal courts'
exercise of jurisdiction over matters relating to reservation affairs could
impair the authority of tribal courts. 67 Third, aid to judicial review: the
National Farmers Union Court stated that exhaustion would provide other
courts with the benefit of the expertise of tribal courts in the event of
further judicial review. 68 Fourth, judicial economy: the Court in National
Farmers Union noted that exhaustion would serve the orderly administration of justice by allowing a full record to be developed in the tribal
courts. 69

Just as there are some recognized exceptions to the tribal exhaustion
of remedies requirement there are also some exceptions to the requirement
of administrative exhaustion of remedies. In its footnote 21, National
Farmers Union had found no need for exhaustion when assertion of
tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a "desire to harass," or is made in
"bad faith," or is contrary to "express jurisdictional prohibitions," or
would be "futile" because of a lack of an adequate opportunity to
challenge the tribal court's jurisdiction. 70 Similarly, exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally not mandated when the remedies are
inadequate or futile, 7' or when the agency is clearly exceeding its jurisdiction. 72 In addition, exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally
not required when a party has alleged agency bias amounting to constitutional violations, or when the federal statute is clearly unconstitutional
on its face.73
As can be seen, the administrative exhaustion exceptions are similar
in spirit to the tribal exhaustion exceptions. Thus, the futility exceptions
are the same and the tribal "express jurisdictional prohibition" exception
is similar to the "clearly exceeding jurisdiction" exception in administrative
law.
More importantly, there is no exception in administrative law similar
to those invoked in Burlington Northern Railroad v. Blackfeet Tribe and
Myrick. That is, the issue is purely a question of federal law. It is true
that in some cases involving additional factors, the fact that the issues

66. National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985).
67. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1986).
68. National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 857.
69. Id. at 856.
70. Id.
71. See Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399 (1988); Coit Indep. Joint Venture v.
FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561 (1989).
72. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
73. For a concise yet informative discussion of the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine
and its exceptions see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 730-43 (3rd ed. 1988).
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to be resolved were purely questions of law has influenced the Supreme
Court not to require exhaustion of administrative remedies. 74 On the
whole, however, since providing federal courts with the expertise of
administrative agencies is only one of the reasons for exhaustion, exhaustion is generally required unless the question of law at issue involves
a clear statutory or constitutional violation. In conclusion, because the
standards for granting an exception to the exhaustion of remedies are
relatively the same in administrative and tribal contexts, the fact that a
case involves questions of federal law should not, in and of itself, be
a sufficient excuse not to mandate exhaustion of tribal court remedies
as long as the resolution of the federal question affects the jurisdiction
of the tribal court or implicates tribal interests.
Although federal courts have not to date drawn on the analogy with
administrative law, the trend is towards requiring exhaustion even in
cases involving purely questions of federal law. For instance, in a later
Burlington Northern case, Burlington Northern Railroad v. Crow Tribal
Council,75 the court mandated exhaustion of tribal remedies. In that case,
the Crow Tribe had enacted an ordinance establishing a commission to
regulate railroads crossing on the Crow Reservation. Burlington Northern
sought a declaratory judgment in federal court that the ordinance was
invalid because the Crow Tribe did not have the sovereign power to
enact it. Burlington Northern claimed that the exhaustion requirement
was not applicable because the proceedings in tribal court exceeded tribal
sovereign jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit resolved the issue by stating:
Both the Supreme Court and this circuit have held that non-Indian
defendants must exhaust tribal court remedies before seeking relief
in federal court, even where defendants allege that proceedings in
tribal court exceed tribal sovereign jurisdiction .... The requirement
of exhaustion of tribal remedies is not discretionary; it is mandatory. 76
In Middlemist v. Lujan, 77 the federal district court compared the two
Burlington cases in order to resolve the question of whether the aquatic
lands conservation ordinance of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes applied to non-Indian landowners. In holding that exhaustion was
indeed mandated, the court first remarked that the challenged ordinance
was important to the well being of the Tribes and their members for
both health and economic reasons and that through the ordinance, the
Confederated Tribes had asserted their commitment to sovereign authority
over reservation affairs by establishing governmental mechanisms for the

74. For instance, in McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969), a person subject to the draft
had not appealed his draft reclassification from an exempt category and was being prosecuted for
draft evasion. The government argued that because he had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies with the Selective Service during the reclassification, he should not be able to argue now
that he was exempt from the draft. The Supreme Court disagreed because the penalty, going to
jail, was severe and all the issues were purely questions of law.
75. 940 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1991).
76. Id. at 1244-45 (emphasis in original).
77. 20 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3072 (1993).
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protection of aquatic habitat on the reservation. 78 The court then added:
The fact that issues of federal law are involved does not diminish
the benefits of exhaustion. The growing expertise of tribal courts need
not be limited solely to interpretations of internal laws and regulations.
To the contrary, the continuous exposure of tribal courts to juristhe value
dictional questions involving issues of federal law increases
79
of their explanations to subsequent reviewing courts.
Although the Middlemist court recognized that in Burlington Northern
Railroad v. Blackfeet Tribe, "the circuit court did not require exhaustion
because the case presented issues of federal law and no proceedings were
pending in tribal court,"8 0 it concluded that "this particular holding has
been called an anomaly by the circuit court itself in a subsequent case."',
Recently, the Ninth Circuit had a chance to revisit this issue in United
States v. Plainbull.12 In Plainbull, the United States had brought an action
in federal district court against members of the Crow Tribe to recover
penalties for grazing livestock on an Indian reservation without a valid
3
grazing permit and without paying grazing fees. The district court had
abstained from taking jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
because the federal government was attempting to enforce federal legislation, the district court did have jurisdiction. Nevertheless, relying on
National Farmers Union and LaPlante, the Ninth Circuit, held that
abstention was proper, and stated: "The fact that the government is
attempting to enforce federal law is immaterial. The alleged trespass was
on tribal land and considerations of comity require that the tribal courts
get first opportunity to resolve this case."' ' The fact that the case involved

78. Id. at 3074.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 3073.
81. Id.; the court relied on footnote 7 of the first Stock West Corp. v. Taylor case, 942 F.2d
at 663. Although the holding of that case was reversed in the en banc decision, 964 F.2d 912 (9th
Cir. 1992), the reversal had nothing to do with the court's statement concerning Burlington Northern
R.R. v. Blackfeet Tribe. The Middlemist court also relied on Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947
F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1991) to conclude that the fact that no case was currently pending in tribal
court was irrelevant and that, therefore, "the lack of tribal proceeding does not negate the exhaustion
requirement." Middlemist, 20 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) at 3073.
82. 957 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1992).
83. Id. at 725. Title 25 provides in part that "[e]very person who drives or otherwise conveys
any stock of horses, mules, or cattle, to range and feed on any lands belonging to any Indian or
Indian tribe, without the consent of such tribe, is liable to a penalty of $1 for each animal or
such stock." 25 U.S.C.A. § 179 (West 1983).
84. Plainbull, 957 F.2d at 728. In the Tenth Circuit, pure questions of federal law were involved
in Tillett v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 636 (10th Cir. 1991). In Tillett, a member of the tribe alleged that
the tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction over her was unconstitutional and that the federal regulations
creating the tribal court were invalid. The suit arose out of an action commenced in a Court of
Indian Offenses. Courts of Indian Offenses are established pursuant to regulations promulgated by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Because the courts are established and governed by regulations
published in the Code of Federal Regulations, they are commonly referred to as "CFR" courts.
Id. at 638. The purpose of these courts is to provide adequate mechanisms of law enforcement to
tribes that have not yet established traditional tribal courts. Although the Tenth Circuit upheld the
district court, which had ruled that the federal regulations creating the tribal court were valid without
waiting for the tribal court to make an initial determination on that issue, it also upheld the district
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questions of federal law was not enough to avoid exhaustion of tribal
court remedies.
The similarities between the two exhaustion doctrines leads one to make
a further comparison with administrative law, and that is in the area of
deference owed administrative decisions on judicial review. Part III analyzes the amount of deference that should be given by federal courts
when they review the jurisdictional determinations of tribal courts.
III.

THE LEVEL OF DEFERENCE OWED TRIBAL COURTS'
JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATIONS

This Part first looks at the current standard of deference given tribal
courts' jurisdictional determinations when they are appealed to the federal
courts pursuant to their federal question and diversity jurisdiction.5 After
examining why there should be some deference given to the decisions of
tribal courts, the particular type of deference that should be given tribal
courts' jurisdictional determinations is analyzed. Because jurisdictional
decisions based on implicit divestiture of tribal sovereignty is treated
differently from decisions based on federal statutes and treaties, an
extensive analysis of the implicit divestiture test is also presented. Finally,
borrowing again from the concept of deference as developed in administrative law, recommendations are made about the proper level of deference that should be owed the jurisdictional determinations of tribal
courts.
A.

The Existing Law
In FMC v. Shoshone Bannock Tribes, 6 the Tribes brought an action
against FMC in tribal court, alleging violation of a tribal employment
ordinance. FMC argued that the Tribes did not have jurisdiction to
enforce the ordinance because FMC was a non-Indian employer operating
on non-Indian fee lands within the reservation. The tribal court held
that the tribe did have jurisdiction. On appeal, the federal district court
reversed. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and found that
the Tribes did have jurisdiction over FMC because there was a consensual
relationship between FMC and the tribe.8 7

court's ruling requiring Tillett to exhaust her tribal remedies on her other claims. Id. at 642. As
already stated, one of those claims alleged that the exercise of tribal court jurisdiction over her
was in violation of the United States Constitution. Id. at 639.
Whitebird v. Kickapoo Hous. Auth., 751 F. Supp. 928 (D. Kan. 1990), also involved pure questions
of federal law where a tribal member sued a tribal housing authority claiming that a letter sent
by the defendant to her employer violated the Federal Privacy Act of 1974. The Housing Authority
filed a motion to dismiss based in part on the fact that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her
tribal remedies. The district court, citing LaPlante, agreed without even discussing whether it was
appropriate to extend LaPlante to such non-jurisdictional cases.
85. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (1988).
86. 905 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).
87. See discussion infra note 107.
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In the course of its decision, the Ninth Circuit elaborated on the correct
standard of review for federal courts to adopt in reviewing tribal court
decisions and stated:
The standard of review of a tribal court decision regarding tribal
jurisdiction is a question of first impression among the circuits ....
The Farmers Union Court contemplated that tribal courts would
develop the factual record in order to serve the "orderly administration
of justice in the federal court." This indicates a deferential, clearly
erroneous standard of review for factual questions .... As to legal
questions, the Farmers Union Court stated that the fact that a tribal
court reviews a question first is helpful because other courts might
"benefit [from] their expertise." This indicates that federal courts
have no obligation to follow that expertise, but need only be guided
by it. Moreover, federal courts are the final arbiter of federal law,
and the question of tribal court jurisdiction is a federal question.
Federal legal questions should therefore be reviewed de novo.8s
There are some problems with FMC's analysis of National Farmers
Union. First and foremost, National Farmers Union never distinguished
between questions of fact and questions of law when it enumerated its
reasons for mandating exhaustion. For instance, the Supreme Court did
not use the words "factual record" but instead used the words "full
record" in connection with the orderly-administration-of-justice justification for exhaustion. 9 In addition, FMC failed to discuss what were
perhaps the Court's two most important reasons for requiring exhaustion:
respecting the congressional policy of encouraging tribal self-government
and respecting the autonomy and authority of tribal courts.
Finally, it is not entirely clear that all "questions" of law should be
subjected to the same standard of review. For instance, it seems clear
that if the jurisdictional question depends on the interpretation of a tribal
law, there should be more deference than if the jurisdictional determination
involves interpretation of a federal statute. 90 These considerations lead
one to ask anew what should be the deference owed the jurisdictional
determinations made by tribal courts.
The Case for Deference
Perhaps the best reasons to advocate for judicial deference to jurisdictional decisions of tribal courts have to do with the realization that
B.

88. FMC, 905 F.2d at 1313-14 (citations omitted).
89. 471 U.S. at 856.
90. As one scholar stated:
There are intriguing questions about the potential deference to, rather than review
of, some tribal court jurisdictional decision making. While it is clear, for example,
that federal courts may review tribal court jurisdictional decision making in light
of alleged mistakes about the contours of federal law relevant to tribal jurisdiction,
it is less clear what a federal court should do when the alleged tribal court mistake
is not one of federal law, but rather of tribal law.
Frank Pommersheim, A Path Near the Clearing: An Essay on Constitutional Adjudication in Tribal
Courts, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 410-11 (1991-92).
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after centuries of colonization and assimilationist policies designed to
result in the dissolution of tribal life into the dominant culture, it is
time to show some respect for tribal institutions that are vital to the
continuation of tribal political and cultural life. Moreover, since in many
cases, the existence of jurisdiction is related to what is vital to tribal
self-government, 9' the determinations of tribal judges are important because they have some significant contributions to make to the development
of a fair and non-culturally biased jurisprudence in this area. Tribal
courts must have a chance to develop their own jurisprudence concerning
what self-determination means to them and define their own vision of
tribal self-government. 92 There are currently over 250 tribes with judicial
systems, each with its own different vision of sovereignty. Therefore,
where the existence of tribal jurisdiction depends on what is necessary
to tribal self-government or vital to self-determination, federal courts
cannot promote generic rules applicable to all tribes.
After warning that the exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts can
be jurispathic, meaning that it can kill law created by communities,
Professor Resnick wrote:
At the core of federal courts' jurisprudence is a question that has
often gone under the name of "sovereignty" but may more fruitfully
be explored in the context of difference. If the word "sovereign"
has any meaning in contemporary federal courts' jurisprudence, its
meaning comes from a state's or a tribe's ability to maintain different
modes from those of the federal government. The United States has
often made claims about the richness of its pluralistic society-made
claims that the loss of state or tribal identity would not only be a
loss to states and tribes, but would also harm all citizens because of
the benefit of living in a country in which not all are required to
follow the same norms. 93
And, writing on the importance of tribal courts, Professor Frank
Pommersheim stated:
Tribal courts do not exist solely to reproduce or replicate the dominant
canon appearing in state and federal courts. If they did, the process
of colonization would be complete and the unique legal cultures of
the tribes fully extirpated. Nevertheless, tribal legal cultures-given
even the most benign view of Indian-non-Indian history-also do not
reflect pre-Columbian tribal standards and norms. This is so because
there has always been a unique legal reality created by tribal resistance

91. See discussion infra notes 101-119.
92. For a persuasive account of the importance of respecting the decisions of tribal courts as
well as the vital role tribal courts play in both American and tribal culture, see Frank Pommersheim,
Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 Wis. L. REv.
411. Professor Pommersheim starts his essay by stating that: "The two most important-and indeed
complementary-projects in the field of contemporary Indian law are the decolonization of federal
Indian law and the simultaneous construction of an indigenous version of tribal sovereignty and
self-rule." Id. at 411.
93. Judith Resnick, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U.
Cm. L. REV. 671, 750-51 (1989).
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to the process of colonization and assimilation. The riprap created
by these forces provides an opportunity for tribal courts to forge a
unique jurisprudence along the fault line created by the ravages of
colonialism and the persistence of tribal commitment to traditional
cultural values. Along this fault line one can see, and feel, the
additional pressures facing tribal courts. A concern about the role
"differences" might play in tribal court jurisprudence generates these
forces. This fault line, in turn, rests on the shifting tectonic plate of
tribal sovereignty."4

C. The Amount of Deference
Generally speaking, there are two ways that a tribe could lose its
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction may be lost by a specific treaty or act of
Congress. This type of loss would be considered a pure question of law.
Most of the cases, however, do not deal with this situation. Instead, the
most frequently made argument is that the tribes have been "implicitly"
divested of their jurisdiction. Borrowing from the jurisprudence of administrative law, it is clear that the test adopted by the Supreme Court
to determine implicit divestiture of tribal jurisdiction does not involve
strictly questions of law but is more akin to applying the law to the
facts. As such, it involves "mixed questions." Yet, in administrative law
these mixed questions are not reviewed de novo but are upheld as long
as they are reasonable or have a rational basis.
Before proceeding to a comparison between the doctrines of deference
in administrative law, an analysis regarding the implicit divestiture test
is necessary in order to show why the test involves the application of
law to facts.
1. From Inherent Sovereignty to Tribal Self-Government: The
Current Test for Determining Whether Tribal Sovereignty has
been Implicitly Divested
Originally, Indian tribes retained all of their inherent sovereign powers
unless such powers had been specifically taken from them by acts of
9
Congress or given up in a treaty with the United States. In 1978,
however, the Court in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe9 announced

94. Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court
Jurisprudence, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 412, 420-21.
95. In 1942, Felix Cohen, perhaps the leading scholar in the field of Indian Law, stated:
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal powers is
marked by adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) An Indian tribe possesses
...all the powers of any sovereign state; (2) Conquest renders the tribe subject
to the legislative power of the United States and, in substance, terminates the
external powers of sovereignty of the tribe . .. but does not by itself affect the
internal sovereignty of the tribe, (i.e., its powers of local self-government); (3) These
powers are subject to qualification by treaties and by express legislation of Congress,
but, as thus expressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in
the Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of government.
FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 123 (1942) (citations omitted).
96. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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a new principle concerning tribal sovereignty. At issue was whether the
Suquamish Indian Tribe had retained the criminal jurisdiction to prosecute
a non-Indian.9 7 The Court held that the Tribe had lost the sovereign
power to prosecute non-Indians.9 8 The Court stated that:
the tribes' retained powers are not such that they are limited only
by specific restrictions in treaties or congressional enactments ...
Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers of
autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those
powers 'inconsistent with their status.'9
In further defining what kind of tribal power was inconsistent with
tribal status, the Court stated that "[ulpon incorporation into the territory
of the United States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the territorial
sovereignty of the United States and their exercise of separate power is
constrained so as not to conflict with the interests of this overriding
sovereignty. " 0

Furthermore, the Court concluded that tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians was in conflict with the interest of United States sovereignty
because:
[F]rom the formation of the Union and the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, the United States has manifested an equally great solicitude

that its citizens be protected ...

from unwarranted intrusions on their

personal liberty. The power of the United States to try and criminally
punish is an important manifestation of the power to restrict personal
liberty. By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United
States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try
non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable
to Congress. ' 0t
It is important to note that under Oliphant, a tribal power is inconsistent
with tribal status if it conflicts with the overriding national sovereignty
of the United States as determined by an Act of Congress or, as was
the case in Oliphant, with values originating in the United States Constitution. ,02
The Oliphant doctrine was somewhat modified, however, in Montana
v. United States. 03 The issue in Montana was whether the Crow Tribe
had jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on lands
located within the Crow reservation but belonging in fee simple to nonIndians.' 0 4 The Court found that the tribe did not have jurisdiction. To

97. Id. at 196.
98. Id.at 195.
99. Id. at 208 (emphasis in original). Since the landmark decision of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), the status of Indian tribes has been considered one of "domestic dependent
nations."
100. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209.
101. Id. at 210.
102. Id. at 108.
103. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
104. Id. at 547.
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arrive at this conclusion, the Montana Court relied on a 1978 case, United

States v. Wheeler. 05 In dicta, Wheeler suggested that Indian tribes had
implicitly lost jurisdiction over non-tribal members because the exercise

of such jurisdiction involved external relations. '° According to the Wheeler
Court, it was inconsistent with the status of Indian tribes as domestic
dependent nations to determine their external relations without congres-

sional authorization. 0 7 The Court did not explain the reasons for its
unfounded conclusion that the exercise of jurisdiction by a tribe over
the activities of non-members inside its own Indian reservation is somehow

an exercise in "external relations" in the way, for instance, that signing

a treaty with Russia would be. 08 Although the Court acknowledged that
Indian tribes retain powers of self-government, it described these powers
as involving "only the relations among members of a tribe." 1 9 Again,
the Wheeler Court did not give any reasons for adopting such a narrow
and ultimately meaningless definition of "powers of self-government."
Although the Montana Court agreed with Wheeler in stating that the
"exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express

congressional delegation,""

°

it did not seem to follow Wheeler in limiting

tribal powers of self-government to "relations" among members. Montana
did not give much direction on how courts are to conduct a judicial

inquiry in determining what is "necessary" to tribal self-government. In
discussing the extent of tribal jurisdiction over non-tribal members on
non-Indian fee lands, however, the Montana Court did state:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations,
even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation,
licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that

105. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
106. The issue in Wheeler was whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
barred a federal prosecution of a tribal member for rape when he had already been convicted in
tribal court of the lesser included offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. See id.
at 316. The Court held that the Clause was not applicable because Indian tribes derive their power
to prosecute from their own inherent sovereignty and not from the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 32930. The Double Jeopardy Clause only forbids subsequent prosecutions for the same crime in the
court of the same sovereign. Id.
107. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.
108. The only previous decisions mentioning restrictions on the Indian nations' powers over
external relations were the two landmark Cherokee decisions authored by Chief Justice John Marshall,
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1931) and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). The text of these cases makes it clear, however, that by "external relations,"
Chief Justice Marshall was referring to the relations between Indian nations and foreign nations.
109. 435 U.S. at 326.
110. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
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conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.",
Montana, therefore, adopted the view that, as a general principle, the
exercise of tribal jurisdiction over non-members is inconsistent with tribal
status because it involves the exercise of "external relations." There are,
however, exceptions. Indian tribes can continue to exercise civil jurisdiction
over non-members if it is necessary to tribal self-government such as
when the conduct of the non-Indians has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security or the health and welfare of the
tribe. In the process of adopting its own theory of Indian Sovereignty,
however, Montana completely transformed the original Oliphant test which
had relied on statutes, treaties, and Constitutional values to find a tribal
power in conflict with an overriding national interest and therefore inconsistent with tribal status.
There seems to be a fundamental disagreement concerning the correct
interpretation of Oliphant between the Montana Court and the National
Farmers Union and LaPlante Courts. While the National Farmers Union
and LaPlante interpretations may, arguably, support FMC's conclusion
that jurisdictional determinations are essentially questions of law, the
implicit divestiture test as understood by Montana and later decisions of
the Supreme Court transforms these jurisdictional determinations into
questions of applying the law to the facts.
Thus, NationalFarmers Union stated that the Court in Oliphant "adopted
the reasoning of early opinions of two United States Attorneys General,
and concluded that federal legislation conferring jurisdiction on the federal
courts to try non-Indians for offenses committed in Indian Country had
'
implicitly preempted tribal jurisdiction. 112
Similarly, in LaPlante, the
Court stated:
Indian tribes retain "attributes of sovereignty over both their members
and their territory," to the extent that sovereignty has not been
withdrawn by federal statute or treaty ....
... civil jurisdiction over such [non-Indian] activities presumptively
lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty
provision or federal statute." 3
This statement is decidedly different from the statement in Montana
which further limits tribal jurisdiction to what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government. It is important to note that I am not arguing
that National Farmers Union and LaPlante were wrong in their interpretation of Oliphant and that, conversely, Montana and Wheeler were

Ill. Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted). Whether this quoted statement is only applicable to tribal
authority over non-Indian activity on non-Indian fee land and does not operate as a restriction of
tribal authority over conduct occurring on Indian land is debatable.
112. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 853-54 (1985).
113. 480 U.S. at 14-18 (citations omitted).
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right. 1' 4 The exact nature of the test devised by the Supreme Court in
determining whether tribal jurisdiction has been implicitly divested is
important, however, because the test should influence the deference given
jurisdictional determinations made by tribal courts.
Although National Farmers Union and LaPlante were decided after
Montana, it seems that in more recent years, the Court has followed the
Montana approach. For instance, in Duro v. Reina,"5 the issue was
whether the tribe had retained criminal jurisdiction over non-member
Indians. In holding that the tribes did not have inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians, the Court could have just extended
the Oliphant test to cover non-member Indians, but Justice Kennedy's
opinion went further. Duro attempted to synthesize Oliphant, Wheeler
and Montana by stating that:
The retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a recognition of certain
additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to
be tribal members. Indians like all others citizens share allegiance to
the overriding sovereign, the United States. A tribe's additional authority comes from the consent of its members, and so in the6 criminal sphere membership marks the bounds of tribal authority.'1
Earlier in the opinion, the Court's discussion had already implied that
non-tribal members could not consent to tribal criminal jurisdiction because the exercise of such jurisdiction involves a serious and unwarranted
intrusion into personal liberty. Duro, however, only dealt with criminal
jurisdiction; the Court's dicta is ambivalent concerning civil jurisdiction.
After first stating that "the retained sovereignty of the tribes is that
needed to control their own internal relations, and to preserve their own
unique customs and social order,""' 7 the Court added:
It is true that our decisions recognize broader retained tribal power
outside the criminal context. Tribal courts, for example, resolve civil
disputes involving nonmembers, including non-Indians .... Civil
authority may also be present in areas such as zoning where the
exercise of tribal authority is vital to the maintenance of tribal integrity
and self-determination." 8
Duro speaks in terms of the existence of tribal jurisdiction as long as
it is "vital" to self-determination, while Montana speaks in terms of
what is "necessary" to protect self-government. It seems that, in this
context, the Court attributes the same meaning to the words "selfgovernment" and "self-determination." Although "vital" to self-deter-

114. It is not the purpose of this article to undertake an in-depth criticism of the Wheeler and
Montana line of reasoning. For a comprehensive critical review of these cases, see Alex Tallchief
Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation that Overturned It:A Power Play of Constitutional
Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767 (1993).

115. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
116. Id. at 693.
117. Id.at 685-86.
118. Id.at 687-88.
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mination appears to embody a higher threshold than "necessary" to selfgovernment, it seems fair to say that the Court has not, up to now,
noted a difference between the two phrases and, therefore, one can
conclude that the two terms could be used interchangeably." 9
20
In its most recent decision on this issue, South Dakota v. Bourland,'
the Court seemed to uphold Montana's holding that tribes can continue
to exercise tribal sovereign powers over non-Indians as long as they are
necessary to tribal self-government. Having first found that the tribe's
2
treaty right to control the non-members had been abrogated by Congress,1 '
the Bourland court considered the applicability of the two Montana
exceptions to the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers
of Indian tribes do not extend to the activities of non-members of the
tribe on non-Indian fee land. The Court, however, endorsed the District
Court's findings that neither of these exceptions applied in this particular

case. 122

In spite of potential inconsistencies' 23 and theoretical flaws, both Duro
and Bourland recognized that tribes do have civil jurisdiction over non119. The Duro Court cited Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408 (1989), to support its "vital to self-determination" statement. Duro, 495 U.S. at 688.
Brendale involved the tribal power to zone non-Indian fee land within an Indian reservation. Because
of its peculiar factual situation and because there is no majority opinion, Brendale is not often
relied upon as an authority. It is interesting to note, however, that the plurality opinion authored
by Justice White talked in terms of a "demonstrably serious impact" on the political integrity,
economic security or health and welfare of the tribe. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 410. This seems to
have a somewhat higher threshold level than the one devised in Montana which talked in terms of
what "threatens or has a direct effect" on the political integrity, economic security or health and
welfare of the tribe. 450 U.S. at 566.
120. 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
121. The issue in Bourland was whether the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe retained the right to
control hunting and fishing by non-members over land which had been ceded by the tribe to the
United States for a flood control project. Id. at 2319. The Court stated that "[h]aving concluded
that Congress clearly abrogated the Tribe's pre-existing regulatory control over non-Indian hunting
and fishing, we find no evidence in the relevant treaties or statutes that Congress intended to allow
the Tribe to assert regulatory jurisdiction over these lands pursuant to inherent sovereignty." Id.
at 2319-20.
122. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2320. The two exceptions are the consensual relation exception and
the "direct effect" exception under which the tribe continues to retain jurisdiction over non-Indians
when their conduct has a direct effect on the political integrity, economic security or health and
welfare of the tribe. Id. The Bourland Court concluded that:
The District Court made extensive findings that neither of these exceptions applies
to either the former trust lands or the former fee lands. And although the Court
of Appeals instructed the District Court to undertake a new analysis of the Montana
exceptions on remand as to the 18,000 acres, it did not pass upon the district
court's previous findings regarding the taken areas as a whole. Thus, we leave this
to be resolved on remand.
Id. (citations omitted).
123. Although the mention of Montana's two exceptions seemed like an endorsement that they
are still good law, Justice Thomas made a strange turnaround in responding to Justices Blackmun
and Souter's dissenting opinion by adding a footnote to his own opinion stating in part that "While
the dissent refers to our 'myopic' focus on the Tribe's prior treaty right to absolute and undisturbed
use and occupation of the taken area, it shuts both eyes to the reality that after Montana, tribal
sovereignty over nonmembers 'cannot survive without express congressional delegation,' 450 U.S.
at 564, and is therefore not inherent." These last words, quoted from Montana, however, are taken
out of context and mischaracterized the opinion. Montana stated that it is only "tribal power
beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations" that
cannot survive without express congressional delegation. This is markedly different from Thomas'
blunt assertion that all tribal sovereignty over nonmembers is forbidden unless delegated by Congress.
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Indians in certain cases. The focus of the inquiry regarding the existence
of tribal jurisdiction has changed, however, from a determination of
whether treaties and statutes have divested the tribe of jurisdiction to
include an additional inquiry as to whether assertion of tribal jurisdiction
is "necessary to tribal self-government" or "vital to the maintenance of
tribal integrity and self-determination."
As explained earlier, the Ninth Circuit held in FMC that National
Farmers Union mandated de novo review of tribal courts' jurisdictional
determinations because it viewed these determinations as involving purely
legal questions such as interpretation of treaties and statutes. As this
section showed, however, more recent cases direct tribal courts to focus
their jurisdictional findings not only on statutes and treaties, but also
on whether tribal jurisdiction exists because it is vital to tribal selfgovernment. In the next section, I will argue that the Montana approach
and its focus on what is vital to tribal self-government does not involve
purely questions of law but involves, instead, the application of law to
the facts. A different scope of judicial review should, therefore, be
adopted. National Farmers Union did not consider this possibility because
it interpreted Oliphant differently than the prevailing interpretations given
in Montana, Duro, and Bourland.
2.

A Practical Analogy to the Doctrine of Deference as Developed
in the Field of Administrative Law
In determining the exact nature and scope of the deference owed
jurisdictional determinations of tribal courts by the federal courts, a
practical analogy can be made to the jurisprudence involving judicial
review of actions of administrative agencies. As recently stated by a
leading text on administrative law:
This question of the scope of review is of crucial importance. Upon
it hinges both the efficacy of the administrative process and the judicial
ability to protect individuals against agency abuses of power .... If
the scope of review is too broad, agencies are turned into little more
than media for the transmission of cases to the courts. 24
In order to strike the proper balance between the interest of the
individuals in having recourse to judicial review and the interest of the
government in respecting the autonomy and expertise of the administrative
agencies, the courts have fashioned standards of judicial review in administrative law which take into account the different expertise of the
courts and the agencies. Thus, questions of law are generally reviewed
de novo while questions of fact are only reversed by the courts if the
findings of the agency are not supported by substantial evidence or are
found to be arbitrary and capricious.
The Supreme Court has described "substantial evidence" as "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a con-

124.

BERNARD

SCHWARTZ,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 624 (3d ed. 1991).
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clusion. ' 125 The landmark decision of Overton Park v. Volpe,26 defined

the scope of the arbitrary and capricious test when the Supreme Court
described its inquiry as "whether the decision was based on a consideration
of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of
27

judgment."

Some have argued persuasively that the substantial evidence test is not
really different from the arbitrary and capricious test. In Association of
Data ProcessingOrganizationsv. Board of Governors, 28 then-Judge Scalia
remarked that the substantial evidence test was only a specific application
of the arbitrary and capricious test. Substantial evidence applies when
there is a formal hearing whereas arbitrary and capricious applies in
informal settings.
Although the exact meaning of the substantial evidence test and the
arbitrary and capricious test has preoccupied many administrative law
scholars, the tests ultimately consider the question of reasonableness; an
agency's finding of facts will be upheld if these facts have a rational
basis.

29

As stated in a leading treatise on administrative law:

Where a question of law is at issue, the court determines the rightness
of the agency answer with its own independent judgement ....Where

a question of fact is at issue, the Court does not weigh the quality
or quantity of the evidence for sufficiency; the court determines only
the reasonableness of the agency answer. 30
Not every question to be determined, however, is either a pure question
of law or a question of fact. Some questions have been termed "mixed"
questions, or to put it another way, questions of applying the law to
the facts. In cases that have analyzed "mixed" questions, courts have
given the same amount of deference to agency findings as if they were
purely questions of fact. The landmark decision in this area is NLRB
v. Hearst.' The employees (called newsboys) in Hearst sought protection
under the National Labor Relations Act. 3 2 The NLRA gave jurisdiction
to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) where an employeremployee relationship existed. Before taking jurisdiction over the matter,
the NLRB had to find that the newsboys were "employees" under the
Act. In reviewing the decision of the NLRB that an employer-employee
125. See Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
126. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
127. Id.at 416.
128. 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
129. The implementation of these tests in an administrative law context is, of course, vastly
influenced by the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 706 (2)(a) & (2)(e) [hereinafter
"APA"]. Section 2(A) directs a reviewing court to hold unlawful any agency action found to be
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Section
2(E) directs an agency action to be set aside if it is "unsupported by substantial evidence in a case
subject to section 556 and 557." Sections 556 and 557 involve cases where there was a "formal"
hearing, meaning one held "on the record." It is to be remembered that the APA itself was a
codification of principles which had been developed by the courts through the common law.
130. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 641 (3d ed. 1991).
131. 322 U.S. 11 (1944).
132. 2"9U.S.C. § 152 (1988).
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relationship did exist, the Supreme Court stated that the Board's determination that specified persons are "employees" under the Act is to be
accepted if it has "warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in law."' 3 3
In other words, the test was one of reasonableness.
At one time, determinations such as the one made in Hearst were
reviewed de novo because they were considered to involve "jurisdictional
facts."'13 4 This involved the determination of "facts" which affected the
issue of whether the agency had jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in O'Keefe
v. Smith,'35 the Supreme Court reviewed a case involving a jurisdictional
fact and stated, "[w]hile this court may not have reached the same
conclusion as the [agency] it cannot be said that [its decision] is irrational
or without substantial evidence on the records as a whole."'1 3 6 Cases such
as O'Keefe have influenced a recent treatise on Administrative Law to
pronounce that "the decisions since Hearst show clearly that jurisdictional
facts are now entitled to no broader scope than non-jurisdictional facts."' 37
The nature of the test to determine tribal jurisdiction should influence
the deference given jurisdictional determinations made by tribal courts.
If the test involves the determination of questions of law, the tribal
decision should, in most cases, be reviewed de novo. 138 Tribal courts'
jurisdictional determinations that are based on what is vital to tribal selfgovernment, however, involve the application of law to facts, or "mixed"
questions of law and fact. Therefore, these determinations should not
be reviewed de novo but should be upheld if reasonable or rational.
In administrative law, it is not always easy to determine whether the
question to be decided is a question of law calling for de novo review
or a "mixed" question calling for a reasonableness or rational basis test.
As stated in one treatise on administrative law:
An agency's application of law to fact requires it to make two distinct
determinations: it must decide what legal constraints govern the problem at hand, and then it must decide what action to take within
those constraints. The former of these two steps involves a determination of law .... Only if the agency's view survives a relatively
independent judicial examination does a court proceed to the second
step: the task of law application in which the reviewing court's function
is considerably more deferential.' 3 9
Applying these principles of administrative law to federal judicial review
of tribal courts' jurisdictional determinations, a federal court would review
independently whether the tribal court has adopted the correct test for
determining if tribal jurisdiction had not been implicitly divested. The

133.
134.
135.
136.

Hearst, 322 U.S. at 131.
See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
380 U.S. 359 (1965).
Id. at 363.

137.

BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 687 (3rd ed. 1991).
138. But see discussion infra notes 139-144.
139. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
82 (3d ed. 1990).
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NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

second step of the process, however, the task of determining, under
Montana, if a consensual relation existed or if the activity is necessary
to tribal self-government or vital to tribal integrity and self-determination,
would only be reviewed under a reasonableness or rational basis test.
Tribal Courts' Jurisdictional Determinations Involving Purely
Questions of Law
As stated earlier, in both National Farmers Union and LaPlante the
Court took the position that in determining whether the tribe had been
implicitly divested of jurisdiction, the tribal court should focus on treaties
and federal statutes. Although it was argued that other Supreme Court
cases had adopted a different approach, focusing instead on what was
vital to tribal self-government, it is undoubtedly true that some cases
will depend on statutory or treaty construction. These types of cases
represent pure questions of law, and the question examined is whether
the tribal court decisions in this context should be reviewed de novo.
In continuing the analogy with administrative law, it is clear that
questions of law should be reviewed de novo unless the case involves
the interpretation of ambiguous provisions contained in treaties or statutes
which were passed expressly for the benefit of the tribe whose tribal
court heard the case.
This conclusion is derived from the landmark decision of Chevron v.
NRDC. 40 The issue in Chevron was whether under the Clean Air Act
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could issue a regulation
which would allow a state to adopt a plant-wide definition of stationary
source so as to treat all the pollution emitting devices within the same
industrial grouping as though they were contained within a single "bubble."
This "bubble" concept would allow an industrial grouping to modify
new or existing pollution sources within the grouping without having to
obtain a new permit from the EPA as long as the alteration did not
increase the total emissions from the plant. The question was whether
the Clean Air Act's definition of "stationary source" allowed the EPA
to proceed with its "bubble" concept.
Under traditional doctrines of judicial review in administrative law, a
question of law would have been reviewed de novo by the courts. The
Chevron Court, however, took a different approach and reviewed the
decision of the EPA on a reasonable standard. The Court stated:
3.

When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always is
the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the
court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise ques-

140. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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tion at issue, the court does not impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
41
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
The Court granted deference to the agency because the EPA's interpretation represented a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies
which Congress had, for one reason or another, decided not to resolve
in the Act. 42 The Court recognized that judges are not experts in making
political choices, and it believed that it was to the agency that Congress
had delegated policy-making responsibilities. The Court also found the
EPA an appropriate forum to determine policy choices because unlike
judges, agencies through the President of the United43 States are more
accountable to the people who elected the Congress.
Following in the footsteps of Chevron, an argument can be made that
if a statute or treaty is silent on tribal jurisdiction or if tribal jurisdiction
depends on a statute or a treaty which is ambiguous in its terms, the
tribal court's initial determination should be upheld if it has a reasonable44
basis and the statute or treaty was passed for the benefit of the Tribe.'
This principle would be consistent with other venerable principles of
statutory construction in the field of federal Indian law which direct the
courts to resolve ambiguous provisions in treaties or statutes to the benefit
of the Indians and45 to construe treaties the way the Indians would have
understood them.
CONCLUSION
Although tribal courts are not administrative agencies, the same policy
reasons should guide the courts to mandate exhaustion of administrative
remedies and of tribal court remedies. It has been argued that the same
principles concerning exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine should be
applied to both tribal and administrative forums. As long as the case
arose on the reservation, exhaustion should be mandated if the four

141. Id. at 842-43. The wisdom of the Chevron doctrine has been widely debated and it is not
the purpose of this article to add to this debate. For a sample of the current controversy, see Colin
S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (1985), Abner
J. Mikva, How Should Courts Treat Administrative Agencies, 36 Am. U. L. REV. 1 (1986). For
a strong endorsement of Chevron, see Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511.
142. 467 U.S. at 865.
143. Id.
144. One of the most highly debated issues in many cases of the post-Chevron era is whether
there is, in fact, an ambiguity or a silence in the statute being litigated. See, e.g., INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); and NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S.
112, 413 (1987).
145. See Choctow Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Choctow Nation v.
Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979); see also Charles Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial
Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as the Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the
Earth"- How Long A Time Is That, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601 (1975).
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National Farmers Union exceptions do not apply and there is a colorable
claim of tribal jurisdiction. In addition, exhaustion should be extended
to all cases arising on Indian reservations even if they involve purely
questions of federal law as long as resolution of the federal question
will have an impact on the jurisdiction of the tribal courts or otherwise
implicates tribal interests.
Similarly, the deference routinely given by the courts to decisions of
administrative agencies should also be awarded to decisions of tribal
courts when these decisions are being reviewed by federal courts under
their federal question jurisdiction or their diversity jurisdiction. This is
especially true for jurisdictional determinations based on whether the
exercise of tribal jurisdiction is vital to tribal self-government or selfdetermination.
It is undoubtedly true that tribal courts have more expertise in determining whether control of a certain activity is essential to tribal selfgovernment. To ignore the determinations of tribal courts, or to leave
the amount of deference owed to tribal courts to the discretion of district
court judges will indeed relegate tribal courts to "media for the transmission of cases" and render the exhaustion requirement almost meaningless. It would also make the implicit divestiture test adopted by the
Supreme Court to determine the existence of tribal jurisdiction a political
and culturally-biased test because determinations concerning what is vital
to tribal self-government would be made by federal judges, most if not
all of whom are non-Indians, without having to pay any attention to
what the Indians themselves think about the matter. The implicit divestiture test is already laden with political subjectivity, and therefore a
complete lack of deference to the decisions of tribal courts would be
greatly detrimental to tribal self-government. Lack of deference to tribal
courts would also be directly contrary to the congressional policy of
protecting tribal self-government and encouraging tribal self-determination, the very policies which have persuaded the Supreme Court to mandate
exhaustion of tribal remedies in the first place.
This article began with a fifteen-year-old anecdote, and it is appropriate
to conclude it with another anecdote which occurred around the same
time. Not long after the take-over at Wounded Knee by members of the
American Indian Movement (AIM), I attended an Indigenous Rights
Conference in Geneva, Switzerland. Russell Means, the co-founder of
AIM and the leader of the Wounded Knee take-over told the assembled
delegates, most of whom were not United States citizens, that his Nation,
the Sioux Nation, lived in the "belly of the Beast;" the "Beast" being
the United States. In many ways, this article has been about altering
that perception. The recommendations given in this article regarding
deference are not ideal, but if implemented, they would represent a
meaningful step towards co-existence with Indian norms and values. It
should be recognized that these norms and values are "different," and
as strange as it may seem, they are "alien" within a country made from
lands which, not long ago, were exclusively "Indian" lands. Perhaps
such a step would begin to change the perception of Indians like Russell
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Means who feel that Indian people have been swallowed by a beast. This
Beast, whether you call it racism, colonialism, or hegemony, would then
appear in the belly of the Indian nations, being slowly digested into
nothingness.

